

pared, introduced, and confirmed by *Bindung*, by the band or by the post" (1987, 395). Mastery itself then, presumes "postal technology," but in its nondeterministic sense. If mastery determines, is determinism, its reliance on postal technology makes it never entirely mastery—and this would have to hold for Freud's basic question about the mastery of the pleasure principle.

Concluding *Beyond . . .* with the discussion of binding as the tension of pleasurepain, Freud again raises the question of time as periodicity. "Again," because at the beginning of *Beyond . . .*, Freud had wondered whether pleasure and unpleasure themselves might not be due to decrease or increase of energy "in a given period of time" (1920, 8). Now he asks whether feelings of tension, which can be either pleasurable or unpleasurable, permit a distinction between bound and unbound energetic processes. Or does the "pleasure and unpleasure series indicate a change in the magnitude of the cathexis within a given unit of time"? (63) Derrida comments: "Inseparable from the phenomena of *binding* (and therefore of pleasure-unpleasure) as from the *quantities* (of cathexis), the so-called units of time cannot not also be *metrical and rhythmical* notions. Beyond opposition, *différance* and rhythm" (1987, 407–8). He then says that in several fragments of *The Will to Power* Nietzsche had already understood pleasure as a rhythm of small painful excitations (408).

Freud's discussion of binding and periodicity has already been related to Nietzsche on repetition and difference. The paradox of the hungry baby is that need satisfaction, tension reduction, repetitively produces a tension-raising registration (the experience of satisfaction as *Bahnung*). Nietzsche, of course, would reject any linkage of hunger and *self* preservation to will to power and eternal return. But Heidegger's conception of care and time, and Derrida's conception of autoaffection as heteroaffection, both produce a thinking of the self as uncanny, temporal: *ekstasis, différance*. In these senses, and in the sense that Heidegger and Derrida both think temporality as a "prior intermediate," Nietzsche's rejection of *self* preservation can be modified. It becomes a question of pleasurepain, of repetition in or of the zone, and particularly of postal binding: nondeterministic self-sending.

Derrida notes here that Nietzsche appears to essentialize pain: the will to suffer as the will to power beyond self preservation. For Nietzsche, the "beyond of the pleasure principle" would be the affirmation of life as pain, the opposite of Freud's return to the inorganic. But postal bind-

ing undermines any opposition between pleasure and unpleasure. It is irreducibly "intervallic" (rhythmic), the "to be repeated" before of the pleasure principle. The essentialism of Nietzsche's affirmation of life as pain can be modified once it intersects with a conception of the *self* as auto-hetero-affectation. In the time-space of demonic repetition, then, it is a question of pain against pain.²¹ Freud knows that a patient may defensively repeat painful experience with the analyst as if it were objectively, uninterpretable present, but he does not know that the patient does so in order to repudiate the pleasurepain of interpretation as differential relation.

When the "degree of aloofness" necessary for interpretation has collapsed, the patient not only clings to the objectively present, he or she also insists on rigid determinism. Hence, analytic neutrality, the interpretive stance itself, cannot presume mastery or determinism. When a patient's "because" is rigidly defensive, the analyst cannot intervene with a "counterbecause." Nietzsche's active interpretation and Heidegger's descriptive interpretation are not causal; both are theories of interpretation as relation. Noncausal interpretation as relation is "postal" in Derrida's sense: a sending without assured arrival at a destination. This again takes us back to "Structure, Sign, and Play," to Nietzschean interpretation as play, as affirmation of chance. Interpretation as the active-descriptive naming of a process dispenses with causality in order to modify rigidly defensive maintenance of it. But effective intervention into defensive maintenance of objectivity and determinism unleashes *Angst*-like anxiety about chaotic loss of control: there is an effect of chance in the neutral, interpretive stance.

Freud was willing to think chance only to a certain extent. Neutrality potentiates free association, but association is "free," nondetermined, only from the point of view of consciousness. The aim is to reveal unconscious determinism, the secret *mastery* of the pleasure principle. Thus, Freud can speak of the role of chance in the formation of symptoms, for example in the "Rat Man" case, without contradicting his conviction about unconscious determinism.

Rat Man suffered from an obsessional neurosis understood by Freud as defense against anal sadistic impulses directed against his father. Rat Man's conflict was exacerbated by an ambivalent reaction to the father's death, producing an identification with him. The father had not paid a gambling debt while in the army. On his own reserve maneuvers, the

patient encountered a "cruel captain," whose stories of anal-sadistic rat tortures *by chance* intersected with his statement that the patient owed a small amount of money to Lieutenant A (1909, 210–11). The patient's major presenting symptom was an obsession about repaying this non-existent debt. One could say that by chance the cruel captain had "interpreted" Rat Man's unconscious dynamics: that he was guilty about his anal sadistic wishes and had identified with his father's failure to pay a gambler's (*Spielratte*) debt. There is both determinism and chance here. Defense against anal sadistic impulses and identification with the dead father *determined* the patient's neurosis; by *chance* the same word, *Ratte*, has both anal and gambling resonances. By chance too, the cruel captain mistakenly identified the person to whom the money was owed. (This mistake will turn out to have major consequences.) The patient's inadvertent encounter with his unconscious dynamics could only intensify his defenses against them, as when "the return of the repressed" produces symptom formation. Hence his frenetic attempts to pay Lieutenant A. From Freud's point of view, once the anal sadistic impulses were expressed in the transference, he could use deterministic interpretation to resolve the very symptoms which the captain's chance remarks had exacerbated. This appears to be a cogent demonstration of unconscious determinism, of the mastery of the pleasure principle, and of interpretation which presumes both. Chance has a role in symptom formation as it intersects with determinism.

But Derrida has found in *Beyond . . .* a critical discussion of how the mastery of the pleasure principle is made possible by postal binding, which implies unconscious chance. Nietzsche advocated interpretation of unconscious differentials of force as play, as affirmation of chance, in order to think interpretation beyond metaphysical determinism. Derrida goes a step further. He demonstrates that chance would have to be implicit to interpretation, not only because postal binding precedes the pleasure principle, but because interpretation is a linguistic act. In an essay on psychoanalysis and literature called "My Chances" he begins with a discussion of chance and determinism in language itself:

Language . . . is only one among those systems of *marks* that claim this curious tendency as their property: they *simultaneously* incline toward increasing the reserves of random indetermination *as well as* the capacity of coding and overcoding or, in other words, for control and self-regulation. Such compe-

tion between randomness and code disrupts the very systematicity of the system while it also, however, regulates the restless, unstable interplay of the system. (1984, 2)

This interplay of determinism and chance, of systematicity and disruption of systematicity, is another way of thinking the relation of the mastery of the pleasure principle (tension reduction) to binding (tension increase) as its prior condition. To return to the hungry baby: need simultaneously leads to the tension reduction of assuaging hunger and the tension increase of the differentiating, spectral, hetero-auto-affective trace of the mother of primary narcissism. Just as binding is the before of the pleasure principle, the trace of the mother of primary narcissism is the prior condition of the wish. If one focuses only on wishes, as Freud tends to do, tension reduction can seem to be the exclusive principle of "control and self-regulation." It then *determines* unconscious processes. However, because the tension increase of differential registration is irreducible, there is always potential disruption of "control and self-regulation," the narcissistic wound of the threat to mastery. Differential registration itself is not predictable: it is an occurrence that depends on an always mobile interplay of forces. As *Bahnung* it is an effect of chance, the unpredictable. It is an "event" as Derrida describes it: "The attempt to submit chance to thought implies in the first place an interest in the *experience . . .* of that which happens unexpectedly . . . unexpectability conditions the very structure of an event . . . an event worthy of this name cannot be foretold" (1984, 5-6).

This model describes the entire analytic situation. According to Freud, the patient maintains his or her compromise formations in obedience to the pleasure principle. In his earliest writings Freud emphasized that the pleasure principle works by replacing a painful experience with a pleasant one (wish fulfillment) *and/or* by repressing, defending against the painful experience. In his later writings, for example *Beyond . . .*, he rethinks this idea in terms of anxiety: because a pleasurable wish or fantasy is linked to anxiety, the pleasure principle insists upon elimination of the anxiety through defense. But Freud does not pursue the idea that reversal of defense can take place only because the mastery of the pleasure principle is not absolute. Loewald understood this idea quite well. He maintained that if there were not an unconscious force of tension increase, no interpretation of defense could ever be effective. This is why Loewald was

so attentive to Freud's concept of Eros as both a sui generis drive to increase tension and as an expression of primary narcissism (1980, 74–75). However, Loewald did not attend to Freud's description of Eros as the "mischief maker" which opposes the regulation of tension decrease. This "mischief maker" is also responsible for chance differentiation. As a *drive*, as an unconscious force, Eros expresses irreducible randomness "in" the unconscious. Like language itself for Derrida, "the unconscious" would have to have the property of "increasing the reserves of random indetermination *as well as* the capacity . . . for control and self-regulation." To use language to intervene in defensive control, *to interpret*, is to rely on linguistic and unconscious openness to chance. Determinism cannot be modified by counterdeterminism—only by chance, by interpretation, as what Derrida calls "event."²²

Free association had always assumed an interplay between determinism and chance. In this respect Derrida notes the frequent way in which chance is related to the idea of "fall." In German, he says, *Zufälligkeit* means "chance"; hence *Einfall*, the word usually rendered as "association," is "an idea that suddenly comes to mind in an apparently unforeseeable manner" (1984, 5). Freud's discussion of chance in symptom formation in the Rat Man case implies exactly this idea: it is as if the "cruel captain" uttered the *Einfällen* which the patient would have to let "befall" him in an analytic setting. However, one can find, as Derrida says, "a thousand declarations by Freud attesting a completely determinist conviction of the positivistic type prevalent in his day. . . . There is no chance in the unconscious" (24). Derrida argues that even if Freud "suspends all epistemological relations to the sciences or to the modern problems concerning chance"—for example, in physics and biology—he nonetheless wanders into this area with his conception of the drive, which is situated on the frontier of the mental and the physical (25). Frontier concepts maintain an intermediacy that is not completely deterministic. From this point of view, it is not by chance that Freud's paper on the destinies of the drives ("Instincts and Their Vicissitudes") should produce a self-sending that is itself intermediate, indeterminately active or passive, subjective or objective. Given that the self-sending of the primary, intermediate phase of scopophilia describes the relation of baby and mother in primary narcissism, it also describes the registration of difference not regulated by the pleasure principle—the possibility of effective interpretation.

This binding tension *marks* the unconscious. As Freud said in his brief

discussion of originally unconscious thought, it is the tension-raising *impression* of a relation. Importantly, Freud had specified that such impressions are not linked to verbal language. Therefore, they cannot be spoken, will not emerge as associative *Einfällen*, unforeseen words, in analysis. But they are “language” in the sense that Derrida speaks here of “marks” whose randomness works with determinism. Because Freud in many ways thinks unconscious processes in terms of nonverbal, differentiating traces, Derrida can say that psychoanalysis is “a discourse that remains *open* [emphasis added] and that attempts at each instant to regulate itself—yet affirming its originality—according to the scientific and artistic treatment of randomness” (1984, 28).

For Heidegger such “opening” is the task of thinking, a task not possible for metaphysics or science. Such thinking is not causal, although it holds ground and cause together as perdurance. Psychoanalysis as a discipline has to be “open,” because it depends upon an “open”—differentiable, “chance”—unconscious. But psychoanalysis has to account for the way in which its openness to nondeterministic processes can *appear* to be closed determinism. On both the theoretical and clinical levels this is the result of disavowal of difference. And on both levels this amounts to privileging verbal expression and determinism over the chance effects of “mark” or “trace.” As a linguistic act, interpretation must be thought as mark, especially if it is to modify defensive determinism.

The modification of unconscious process as chance mark is another way to understand interpretation which modifies what it interprets—“spectral interpretation.” Spectrality itself implies Freud’s “psychic reality,” the virtuality which Derrida called the “*différance* of the technical apparatus.” Psychic reality itself is suspended between the fictive and the real. Clinically, defensive determinism is often accompanied by rejection of the “fictitious” or “as if” quality of psychic reality, particularly as expressed in the transference. Interpretation of defensive determinism involves interpretation of defenses against fictiveness, against the uncanniness of psychic reality. This means that there is a link between “fictive reality” and chance, the conditions of possibility of transformative interpretation.

When Freud speaks of *psychic reality*, and at the end of his life of the registration and repudiation of *reality*, he in general does not see that both imply the reality of difference. “Difference” in general is an effect of *différance*—hence its link to play or chance as undecidably “fictive-real.” But hence too its link to what Derrida has called life-death, the suspension